reva555 Sat Apr 16, 2011 2:28 pmThe distinctive
The distinctive feature, then, of intuitionbiic views ts not their being tcfcolog caI or deontotogicaL but the espe¬cially prominent place thai they give to the appeal to our intuitise capacities unguxled by constructive and Tory Burch Flats recognizably ethical criteria. Intuitionism denies that there exists any useful and explicit solution to the priority problem. I now tum to a brief discussion of thb topic. 8. THF. PRIORITY PROBLEM We have seen that intuitionism raises the question of the extent to which it b possible to give a systematic account of our considered judgments of the just and the unjust. In particular, it holds thai no constructive answer can be given lo the problem of assigning weights to competing principles of justice. Here at least we must rely on our intuitive capacities. Classical utilitarianism tries, of course, to avoid the appeal to intuition altogether. It fe a single-principle conception with ooe ultimate standard; the adjustment of weights is. in theory anyway, sctikd by reference to the ptincif^c Tory Burch Outlet of utility. Mill thought that there must be but one such standard, otherwise there would be no umpire between competing criteria, and Sedgwick argues at length that the utilitarian principle Is the only one which can assume this rote. They maintain thai our moral judments are implicitly utilitanan in the sense that when confronted with a clash ot precepts, or with notions which ate vague and imprecise, we have no alternative ex¬cept to adopt utilitarianism. Mill and Sidgwkk believe that at some point we mint have a single principle to straighten out and lo sys¬tematize our judgments." Undeniably one oi the great attractions of the classical doctrine is ihe way il faces the priority problem and tries to avoid reiving on intuition. As I have already remarked, there is nothing necessarily irrational in the appeal to intuition to settle questions of priority. We must recognize ihe possibility that there is no way to get beyond a plurality of principles. No doubt any conception of justice will have to rely on intuition to some degree. Nevertheless, we shook! do what we can to reduce the direct appeal to our considered judgments. For if men balance final principles differently, as presumably they often do. then their conceptions of justice arc different. The assignment ot weights is an essential and not a minor pari of a conccptioo of justice.
The distinctive feature, then, of intuitionbiic views ts not their being tcfcolog caI or deontotogicaL but the espe¬cially prominent place thai they give to the appeal to our intuitise capacities unguxled by constructive and Tory Burch Flats recognizably ethical criteria. Intuitionism denies that there exists any useful and explicit solution to the priority problem. I now tum to a brief discussion of thb topic. 8. THF. PRIORITY PROBLEM We have seen that intuitionism raises the question of the extent to which it b possible to give a systematic account of our considered judgments of the just and the unjust. In particular, it holds thai no constructive answer can be given lo the problem of assigning weights to competing principles of justice. Here at least we must rely on our intuitive capacities. Classical utilitarianism tries, of course, to avoid the appeal to intuition altogether. It fe a single-principle conception with ooe ultimate standard; the adjustment of weights is. in theory anyway, sctikd by reference to the ptincif^c Tory Burch Outlet of utility. Mill thought that there must be but one such standard, otherwise there would be no umpire between competing criteria, and Sedgwick argues at length that the utilitarian principle Is the only one which can assume this rote. They maintain thai our moral judments are implicitly utilitanan in the sense that when confronted with a clash ot precepts, or with notions which ate vague and imprecise, we have no alternative ex¬cept to adopt utilitarianism. Mill and Sidgwkk believe that at some point we mint have a single principle to straighten out and lo sys¬tematize our judgments." Undeniably one oi the great attractions of the classical doctrine is ihe way il faces the priority problem and tries to avoid reiving on intuition. As I have already remarked, there is nothing necessarily irrational in the appeal to intuition to settle questions of priority. We must recognize ihe possibility that there is no way to get beyond a plurality of principles. No doubt any conception of justice will have to rely on intuition to some degree. Nevertheless, we shook! do what we can to reduce the direct appeal to our considered judgments. For if men balance final principles differently, as presumably they often do. then their conceptions of justice arc different. The assignment ot weights is an essential and not a minor pari of a conccptioo of justice.
